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Abstract
A valuation-based system approach to knowledge representation has shown its advantages in improving computational
efficiency and in allowing many decision models including belief networks. This study applies the Dempster–Shafer theory of
belief functions and extends its framework to allow coarse valuations, which admit incomplete specification of probabilities and
utilities and, therefore, are more flexible in representing asymmetric decision problems. It presents an algorithm for making
inferences and decisions in systems using coarse valuations. It shows that a coarse valuation-based system provides a most
natural and compact representation of decision problems.
D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Decision support systems; Expert systems; Belief functions; Asymmetric decision problems
1. Introduction
In a valuation-based system [17], we represent
knowledge by functions called valuations. We draw
inferences from such systems using two operations
called combination and marginalization. Combination
corresponds to the aggregation of knowledge and
marginalization corresponds to the coarsening of
knowledge. The valuation-based system approach to
knowledge representation is expressive in the sense
that it allows many decision models including the
Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions [21] and
possibility theory [5,18]. Its representation for the
Bayesian decision model [17,19] is similar to influ-
ence diagrams [20].
A graphical depiction of a valuation-based system
is called a valuation network. Like an influence
diagram, a valuation network compactly represents
the probabilistic dependence in a problem domain. It
allows more efficient computation when implement-
ing them in decision support systems. However, a
critical hurdle in the implementation is their failure to
efficiently capture asymmetric dependencies between
events and choices. In order to work around this
problem, systems developers have to create dummy
events and acts, and degenerate probabilities and
utilities. In some highly asymmetric problems, such
artifacts constitute a major portion of problem inputs
and cause unnecessary computation. More impor-
tantly, they are artificial constructs and hinder effec-
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tive communication between decision makers and
systems developers.
This paper extends the framework of valuation-
based systems to represent asymmetric decision prob-
lems using a belief function-like calculus, called coarse
valuations. The calculus admits incomplete specifica-
tions of probabilities such as a vacuous belief for a state
space and a non-additive probability for a subset of the
state space. The notion of coarse valuations provides a
natural and compact way of representing asymmetric
decision problems. It reduces the need for artificial
events and acts, and degenerate probabilities and util-
ities. It captures both structural asymmetry and numer-
ical coalescence at the functional level so that the
graphical representation of an asymmetric problem is
as compact as that of a symmetric one.
This paper has two distinctive contributions to
model representation in general and the techniques of
valuation-based systems in particular. First, it proposes
a new representation of domain knowledge for decision
support by allowing coarse valuations, which include
probabilities and belief functions as special cases. The
new representation improves the flexibility and effi-
ciency of decision-model representation. It is able to
represent asymmetric decision problems as compactly
as a symmetric valuation network while reducing 60–
96% of dummy events and acts, and degenerate prob-
abilities and utilities. Second, it re-defines combination
and marginalization operations, re-describes Shenoy’s
fusion algorithm [17,19], and proposes a complete
algorithm for coarse valuation-based systems.
An outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we review related studies. In Section 3, we illustrate
the nature of asymmetric problems and describe a
valuation network representation using coarse valua-
tions. In Section 4, we define three basic operations
for coarse valuations. In Section 5, we propose a
fusion algorithm for coarse valuation-based systems.
In Section 6, we show the correctness of the fusion
algorithm. In Section 7, we illustrate the algorithm by
solving an example. Finally, in Section 8, we make
some concluding remarks.
2. Related studies
Asymmetry can be viewed as an unbalanced
dependence among uncertain events and acts. From
this viewpoint, a problem is asymmetric if it has a
decision tree representation that is unbalanced, i.e.,
not all scenarios contain the same sequence of acts
and events. Therefore, to represent asymmetry, one
has to capture the event/act dependence. Based on this
idea, several methods have been proposed. For exam-
ple, Call and Miller [2] describe a representation using
separate decision trees and influence diagrams. Fung
and Shachter [6] and Qi et al. [15] propose an
adaptation of influence diagrams. Smith et al. [23]
describe a representation using an influence diagram
and several conditional distribution trees, which rep-
resent local event/act dependence. Covaliu and Oliver
[3] use a so-called sequential decision diagram to
represent the event/act dependence. Shenoy [22] pro-
poses a new type of valuations called indicator valu-
ations to represent the event/act dependence. Liu and
Shenoy [12] decompose an asymmetric problem into
several symmetric sub-problems and use a symmetric
valuation network to represent each of the symmetric
sub-problems. Demirer and Shenoy [4] propose a new
representation called sequential valuation networks
that is a hybrid of sequential decision diagrams [3]
and symmetric valuation networks [17]. Nielsen and
Jensen [14] describe a new representation called
asymmetric influence diagrams that is a hybrid of
influence diagram and sequential decision diagrams.
Finally, Bielza and Shenoy [1] compare decision trees,
conditional distribution trees [23], sequential decision
diagrams [4], and indicator valuations [22].
3. Knowledge representation
A coarse valuation-based system represents an
inference and decision-making problem using both a
graphical depiction called a coarse valuation network
and a set of normalized tables. By using set-to-point
mappings, each table represents an uncertainty or
payoff valuation (function). By using variable and
valuation nodes as well as precedence constraints, the
coarse valuation network provides a control structure
for problem solving.
3.1. An example
Before we discuss our representation technique, let
us describe the used car buyer’s problem [7] as an
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example of a highly asymmetric decision problem
[15,22,23].
Joe is considering buying a 3-year-old Spartan
sedan at a price of US$1000. The going rate for a
similar car in the used car market is US$1100. Joe is
unsure whether the car is a ‘‘lemon’’ or a ‘‘peach.’’ Of
the 10 major mechanical systems in the car, a peach
has only 1 defective system, while a lemon has defects
in 6 of the 10 systems. From historical data, 20% of
Spartan cars were lemons and the other 80% were
peaches. The cost of repairing one defect is US$40
and the cost of repairing six defects is US$200. For an
additional US$60, Joe can buy the car from the dealer
with an anti-lemon guarantee. The anti-lemon guar-
antee will normally pay for 50% of the repair cost,
but, if the car is a lemon, it will pay the full repair cost
of US$200.
The dealer gives Joe an hour to have the car
examined by a mechanic. The mechanic suggests
three alternative diagnostic tests—steering, transmis-
sion, fuel, and electrical—to determine the car’s
condition. All tests are able to detect the defects (if
any) of their testing systems. The steering test costs
US$9, the transmission test costs US$10, and the fuel
and electrical test costs US$13. After reviewing the
result of transmission test, for an additional US$4,
Joe can proceed to have the differential system also
tested.
A decision tree representation and solution for this
problem can be found in Ref. [7]. A coarse valuation
network representation is shown in Fig. 1. The opti-
mal strategy is to do the fuel and electrical test; if both
systems are non-defective, then buy with no anti-
lemon guarantee, else buy with anti-lemon guarantee.
The maximum expected payoff is US$32.89.
3.2. Variables
We represent a decision variable in a valuation
network by a rectangular-shaped node. We use sym-
bol XD to denote the set of all alternatives available at
decision D. By making a decision D, we mean that the
decision-maker chooses one and only one of the
elements of XD. We call XD the state space of D.
In the used car buyer’s problem, there are three
decision variables T, D, and B, respectively, represent-
ing the initial test decision (which test to conduct?),
the differential test decision (whether or not to con-
tinue with the differential test?), and the final purchase
decision (whether or not to buy the car or buy the car
with an anti-lemon guarantee?). The state space for T
has four acts: no test (t0), do the steering test (t1), do
the fuel and electrical test (t2), and do the transmission
test (t3). The state space for D has two acts: do the
differential test (d1) and no test (d0). The state space
for B has three alternatives: not buy the car (b0), buy
the car with anti-lemon guarantee (b1), and buy the car
without the anti-lemon guarantee (b2).
We represent a random variable in a valuation
network by an elliptical-shaped node. We use the
symbol XR to denote the set of all possible values
for random variable R. We assume that one and only
one of the elements of XR is the true value of R. We
call XR the state space for R.
Fig. 1. A coarse valuation network for the used car buyer’s problem.
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In the used car buyer’s problem, there are three
random variables: the result of the first test O, the
result of the differential test R, and the car’s condition
C. The state space for O has three elements: zero
defect, one defect, and two defects. The state space for
R has two elements: defective (0) and non-defective
(1). The state space for C has two elements: peach (cp)
and lemon (cl).
3.3. Coarse payoff valuations
For any finite set of variables X, let XX denote its
state space. Let x denote a state in XX and x a subset of
values in XX.
A coarse payoff valuation is a set to point mapping.
Suppose p is a payoff valuation for X. Then, p(x)
measures the payoff to the decision maker if xax. The
values of a payoff valuation are consequences, for
example, utilities and profits.
In a valuation network, we use a diamond to
represent a payoff valuation. To permit the identifica-
tion of all variables in its domain, we draw undirected
edges between a payoff valuation node and all the
variable nodes in its domain. In the used car buyer’s
problem, the payoff valuations p, q, and r are shown
in Fig. 1, and are numerically specified in Table 1.
The specifications are self-explanatory except for
r(b0, XC) = 0, which means that, if the decision B is
not to buy the car, the payoff r = 0 regardless of the
car’s condition (C). In other words, given B = b0, r is
independent of C. Note that r is not totally independ-
ent of C; if B = b1, then r is dependent on C. To
represent such an asymmetric event/act dependency,
in a traditional valuation network or an influence
diagram, r(b0, XC) = 0 have to be specified as r(b0,
cp) = 0 and r(b0, cl) = 0.
The above-mentioned asymmetry is common in
decision problems: the payoff of not marketing a
product is independent of the market condition; the
payoff of not drilling a well is independent of whether
the hole has oil or not; the payoff for a 3-year bank
certificate of deposit is independent of stock market
conditions, macroeconomic conditions, and govern-
ment controls. In general, assume p is a payoff
valuation for X. If there exists a subset x such that
for any values xax, p(x) is a constant k, then we
coalesce them into one specification: p(x) = k. This
representation applies to the special case when x is a
singleton or an entire state space.
For each payoff valuation p for X, we require that,
for any xaXX, there exists one and only one subset x
such that xax and p(x) is specified. We call this
requirement the payoff completeness. It stipulates that
there be one payoff value assigned to every point x in
XX.
3.4. Coarse probability valuations
In a coarse valuation network, uncertainties are
represented by coarse probability valuations. Similar
to a coarse payoff valuation, a coarse probability
valuation is a real-valued mapping. Let H and T be
two disjoint sets of variables. Suppose a is a proba-
bility valuation for H given T. Then, a(hjt) measures
the probability that Hah given Tat.
Coarse probabilities have the flavor of conditional
belief functions [13]. Mathematically, a coarse prob-
ability valuation must satisfy a set of axioms similar to
that for the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief func-
tions [16]. Semantically, the assignment of coarse
probabilities follows the notion of evidential support
[16]; we assign a positive probability to (hjt) if there
is a piece of evidence that partially supports (hjt). We
call an assertion (hjt) focal if a(hjt)>0. Correspond-
ingly, we call h the focal head and t the focal tail.
The notion of coarse probabilities has three non-
trivial special cases. First, if every focal head is XH,
then a is a vacuous probability function of H given T.
Second, if every focal tail is XT, then our knowledge
about H is irrelevant to that about T. a is a Dempster–
Shafer basic probability assignment function for H.
Finally, if every focal head and focal tail is a single-
ton, then a is a conditional probability distribution
function.
In a coarse valuation network, we use a triangular
node to represent a coarse probability valuation.
Suppose a is a conditional probability valuation of
Table 1
Coarse payoff valuations for the used car buyer’s problem
T p {B, C} r D q
t0 0 b2 cp 60 d0 0
t1  9 b2 cl  100 d1  4
t2  13 b1 cp 20
t3  10 b1 cl 40
b0 XC 0
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H given T. To permit the identification of variables,
we draw a directed edge pointing to each variable in H
and an undirected edge to each variable in T from the
a node. In the used car buyer’s problem, there are
three coarse valuations a, b, and c as shown in Fig. 1
and numerically specified in Table 2, where a is a
conditional probability valuation of O given {T, C}, b
is a conditional probability valuation of R given {T, O,
D, C}, and c is a marginal probability valuation for C.
Note that, following the convention of Lauritzen
and Spiegelhalter [10], we write the coarse proba-
bility valuations using the potential form. For exam-
ple, b(XT, XO, d0, XR, XC) = 1.0 should be interpreted
as b(XRjXTXO d0XC) = 1.0. In addition, as in
belief functions, a coarse probability valuation is only
specified for its focal elements. Therefore, a table of
coarse probability valuations has no zero values.
Much of Table 2 is self-evident. For example,
c({cp}) = 0.8 and c({cl}) = 0.2 represent the statistic
knowledge that 20% of Spartan cars are lemons. Note
that a differential test is conducted only when the
transmission test is initially chosen. Since a peach has
one defective system, there will be a 1/9 chance that
the differential system is bad if the initial transmission
test does not spot any defect. On the other hand, the
probability vanishes if the transmission test fails.
Therefore, we have b(t3, 0, d1, 1, cp) = 1/9, b(t3, 0,
d1, 0, cp) = 8/9, and b(t3, 1, d1, 0, cp) = 1.0. The last
four specifications of b in Table 2 can be interpreted
in a similar manner.
The first value of b, i.e., b(XT, XO, d0, XR,
XC) = 1.0, needs some explanations. Note that if no
differential system test (d0) is conducted, there will be
no differential test results. In the parlance of belief
functions, we have a vacuous belief about the differ-
ential test result (R) given non-differential system test
(d0). Therefore, the whole state space of R, XR, is a
focal element and takes the whole belief mass. In
addition, given no differential test, D = d0, our knowl-
edge about the test results is irrelevant to that about
the initial test (T), the initial test result (O), and the
car’s condition (C). In other words, the above vacuous
belief function is independent of T, O, and C given d0.
Therefore, we have a basic probability assignment
b(XT, XO, d0, XR, XC) = 1.0.
It is interesting to note how a traditional valuation-
based system and an influence diagram represent the
same uncertainties. First, we need to create an artifi-
cial state ‘‘no result’’ (nr) for both O and R. Then, the
above b(XT, XO, d0, XR, XC) = 1.0 would have to be
replaced by 96 degenerate probabilities as follows:
b(t, o, d0, nr, c) = 1.0, b(t, o, d0, 0, c) = 0, for any
taXT, oa{nr, 0, 1, 2}, and caXC. In addition,
because of the introduction of the artificial state nr,
we need to specify b(t, o, d1, 0, c) = 0 for oa{nr, 0, 1,
2} and caXC. Furthermore, for ta{t0, t1, t2}, there
will be no differential test to follow. To make b
complete, we need to add 72 more numerical speci-
fications as b(t, o, d1, r, c) = 0 for ta{t0, t1, t2}, oa{nr,
0, 1, 2}, ra{nr, 0, 1}, and ca{cp, cl}. In total, we
need 192 specifications for the valuation b to be
completely specified. Compared with the eight spec-
ifications in Table 2, the existing approach demands a
lot of extra work in representing such a piece of
simple knowledge. Even worse is that many of the
extra specifications are artificially created for the
purpose of fitting in the model and carry neither
useful data for computation nor semantic meaning to
a decision maker.
The coarse probability valuation a in Table 2
represents the conditional probability of the test result
O given the initial test T and the car’s condition C. Of
10 major systems, a peach has only 1 defective
system. Thus, if the electric system is bad, the fuel
system will be not and vice versa. Thus, if the fuel and
electric test t1 is done, there are two possible test
results: neither the fuel nor the electric system is bad
(O = 0), either the fuel or the electric system is bad
(O = 1). By doing little analysis, we have a(t2, 0,
cp) = 0.8 and a(t2, 0, cp) = 0.2. On the other hand, a
lemon can have up to six defective systems. If the fuel
and electric test (t2) is done, there are three possible
Table 2
Coarse probability valuations for the used car buyer’s problem
{T, O, C} a {T, O, D, R, C} b C c
t0 XO XC 1 XT XO d0 XR XC 1 cp 0.8
{t1, t3} 0 cp 0.9 t3 0 d1 0 cp 8/9 cl 0.2
{t1, t3} 0 cl 0.4 t3 0 d1 1 cp 1/9
{t1, t3} 1 cp 0.1 t3 1 d1 0 cp 1
{t1, t3} 1 cl 0.6 t3 0 d1 0 cl 3/9
t2 0 cp 0.8 t3 0 d1 1 cl 6/9
t2 1 cp 0.2 t3 1 d1 0 cl 4/9
t2 0 cl 0.13 t3 1 d1 1 cl 5/9
t2 1 cl 0.53
t2 2 cl 0.33
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test results: neither the fuel nor the electric system is
bad (O = 0), either the fuel or the electric system is bad
(O = 1), or both are bad (O = 2). Thus, we have the last
three specifications of a in Table 2 (hypergeometric
distribution with N = 10, p = 0.6, n = 2).
If no initial test is done (t0), one is ignorant about
the test result and the belief is independent of the car’s
condition. Therefore, we have a(t0, XO, XC) = 1.0.
If we do the steering test (t1) or the transmission test
(t3), the probability of finding zero defects is 0.9 given
that the car is a peach (cp). Therefore, we have a(t1, 0,
cp) = 0.9 and a(t3, 0, cp) = 0.9. They can be coalesced
into one specification a({t1, t3} {0} {cp}) = 0.9,
which means that our belief about the assertion
({0}j{t1, t3} {cp}) is 0.9 according to the notion of
coarse probability valuations. Similarly, we can obtain
the remaining specifications of a in Table 2.
If a is specified as a probability function, we would
have to first create an artificial state ‘‘no result’’ (nr)
for O and then specify 40 numerical values; among
them 26 are degenerate.
In sum, the coarse valuation network is very
expressive and compact in representing asymmetric
decision problems. First of all, it does not need to
create any artificial states or acts such as ‘‘no result’’ if
no test is done. Second, it eliminates all zero proba-
bilities from further manipulations. Third, two or more
numerical specifications may be coalesced into one as
we did for the payoff valuation r in Table 1 and the
valuation a in Table 2. As illustrated, by representing
the above a, b, and c as coarse probabilities, the
valuation network can successfully avoid most of
the degenerate probabilities and all the artificial states.
To permit uncertainty reasoning and problem solv-
ing in a coarse valuation-based system, we require
coarse probability valuations to satisfy three condi-
tions: the belief completeness condition, the compati-
bility condition, and the expectability condition. Like
the payoff completeness condition, the belief com-
pleteness condition stipulates that, for each random
variable R, there exists at least one conditional prob-
ability function of H given T such that RaH. The
compatibility condition ensures no cycles of condi-
tional probabilities such that a1 is a conditional prob-
ability function of X given Y while a2 is of Y given X.
In addition, the compatibility condition ensures the
inferability of two logical assertions. For example, to
make an inference based on two rules, we naturally
need the conclusion of the first rule to be more specific
than the condition of the second rule. The expectability
condition enables us to multiply a coarse payoff
valuation with a coarse probability valuation. Without
it, we cannot apply expectation operations.
3.5. Precedence constraints
Besides variables, beliefs, and payoffs, an impor-
tant ingredient in a coarse valuation network is
information constraints. Some decisions have to be
made before the observation of some uncertain events,
and other decisions can be postponed until after some
events are observed. In the used car buyer’s problem,
for example, the car’s condition is revealed only after
we purchase the car or perhaps never revealed. And
the decision whether to buy the car or not may be
postponed until the test result is revealed.
If a decision maker expects to be informed of the
true value of random variable R before he makes a
decision D, then we represent this situation by the
binary relation R!D (read as R precedes D). On the
other hand, if a random variable R is only revealed
after a decision D is made or perhaps never revealed,
then we represent this situation by the binary relation
D!R. It is possible that in some problems, we may
have precedence constraints between two decision
nodes or between two random variable nodes. For
example, if random variable R2 is only revealed after
random variable R1 is revealed, we represent this by
the relation R1!R2.
In the used car buyer’s problem, we have the pre-
cedence constraints T!O, O!D, D!R, R!B,
and B!C. The first test result (O) is only revealed
after we make the decision to test either of steering,
transmission, and fuel and electrical systems (T). The
decision to do the differential test (D) is only made
after observing the transmission test results (O).
Finally, the decision to buy the car (B) is made after
observing all test results and the car’s condition is
revealed after the decision of purchasing (B).
A problem can be incorrectly over-constrained
permitting no solution. For example, if D!R and
R!D, then this will preclude a solution. Therefore,
we do not permit such precedence constraints. What
restrictions do we need to impose on the precedence
relation ! ? We require three conditions. First, we
require that the transitive closure of ! , denoted by >,
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is a partial order. We call this first condition the
partial order condition. Second, we require that this
partial order > is such that for any decision variable D
and any random variable R, either D>R or R>D. We
call this second condition the perfect recall condition.
Third, if there exists a conditional probability function
of H given T, which contains a decision variable D,
and D is minimum in H[T, then we require that the
probability function is independent of D. We call this
third condition the semantic condition.
Before we explain the reasons for these three
conditions, we need the notions of transitive closure
and partial ordering:
The transitive closure of ! is defined as follows:
 X>Y whenever X! Y and
 X>Y whenever there exists a variable Z such that
X>Z and Z>Y.
A binary relation > is a partial order if it is irre-
flexive and transitive.
The reason for the partial order requirement is
obvious. The reason for the perfect recall condition
is as follows. Given the meaning of the precedence
relation ! , for any decision variable D and any
random variable R, either R is known when decision
D has to be made, or not. This translates to either R>D
or D>R. Finally, the semantic condition is dictated by
the meaning that a probability function measures the
degrees of beliefs about uncertain propositions.
4. Knowledge operations
In a coarse valuation-based system, we represent
knowledge by coarse valuations. We draw inferences
and make decisions using two operations called com-
bination and marginalization. In this section, we
describe these two operations.
4.1. Combination
Suppose p is a payoff valuation of X and r is a
payoff valuation of Y. Their combination, denoted by
pr or rp, is a payoff valuation of Z =X[Y defined
as follows:
ðp  rÞðzÞ ¼ pðxÞ þ rðyÞ; ð1Þ
where x and y are respectively the projection of z to X
and Y, which are defined as follows:
z#X ¼ fx j z \ ðfxg  XZX Þ p tg;
z#Y ¼ fy j z \ ðfyg  XZY Þ p tg: ð2Þ
Note that Eq. (1) is well defined in the sense that, for
every non-empty subset zoXZ, there cannot be two or
more pairs of subsets (x, y) such that z#X = x and
z#Y= y. Otherwise, one can verify that it violates the
payoff completeness condition.
Suppose p is a payoff valuation of X and a is a
probability valuation bearing on Y. Their combination,
denoted by pa or ap, is a payoff valuation of
Z =X[Y defined as follows:
ðp  aÞðzÞ ¼ pðxÞaðyÞ: ð3Þ
where z#X = x and z#Y= y. Because of the belief
completeness condition and the expectability condi-
tion, Eq. (3) is well defined.
Suppose a and b are two compatible probability
valuations respectively defined on X and Y. Their
combination, denoted by ab or ba, is a probability
valuation on Z =X [ Y:
ða  bÞðzÞ ¼ RfaðxÞbðyÞ j z#X ¼ x; z#Y ¼ yg: ð4Þ
One can prove that Eq. (4) generalizes both Demp-
ster’s rule of combination and Bayesian rule of con-
ditioning. If a and b are both Dempster–Shafer belief
functions, Eq. (4) is the same as Dempster’s rule
except for normalization. On the other hand, assume
that the heads of a and b are disjoint as for conditional
probabilities. Because of the compatibility of a and b,
there exists a unique pair of focal elements (x, y) that
satisfies z#X= x and z#Y= y for zoXZ. Then, Eq. (4) is
reduced to:
ða  bÞðzÞ ¼ aðxÞbðyÞ: ð5Þ
The semantics of combination is justified as follows.
Eq. (1) basically assumes the additive decomposition
of a multi-attribute value function [8]. Eq. (3) computes
expected utilities and, therefore, assumes a normative
preference structure whenmaking choices under uncer-
tainty [11]. Eq. (4) is consistent with Dempster’s rule of
combination when combining marginal belief func-
tions and the Bayesian rule of conditioning when
combining conditional probability functions.
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Table 3 illustrates the combination of a and b and
Table 4 shows the combination of ab and c. Since
every random variable belongs to the head of one and
only one conditional probability valuation, Eq. (5) is
applicable. I.e., we can simply intersect focal elements
and multiply their corresponding probabilities. Note
that the combination of coarse probability valuations
is associative and commutative. The order of combin-
ing them does not matter and (ab)c can be
equivalently written as abc.
4.2. Marginalization
Marginalization means deleting variables from a
valuation or projecting a valuation to its partial
domains. Depending on the type of variable being
deleted, the definition of marginalization is different.
When a decision variable D is to be eliminated
from a payoff valuation, marginalization corresponds
to the maximization of the payoff valuation by select-
ing a subset from XD for D. Precisely, assume p is a
payoff valuation of X and DaX. The marginal of p for
Y=X {D}, denoted by p#Y, is a payoff valuation for
Y defined as follows:
p#Y ðyÞ ¼ maxfpðxÞ j yox#Yg ð6Þ
Eq. (6) corresponds to a decision tree solution
process called ‘‘folding back.’’ It assumes that the
decision-maker wants to maximize the payoff valu-
ation. This is true if the payoff values represent utility,
profits, probability of success, etc. On the other hand,
if the decision-maker wishes to minimize the payoff
values such as disutility, cost, and probability of
failure, then we need to substitute min for max in
Eq. (6).
When marginalizing a decision variable out of a
payoff valuation, we need bookkeeping the subset d,
in which the maximum is achieved. Formally, we call
the mapping wD: y! d a solution for D with respect
to p. Tables 5 and 6 in Section 7 show the margin-
alization of m to {T, O, D, R} and the solution for B
with respect to m.
Assume a is a probability valuation defined on X
and is independent of D. To marginalize D out of a is
to simply drop D out of X. Formally, the marginal of a
for Y= X {D}, denoted by a#Y, is a conditional
probability function for Y defined as follows:
a#Y ðyÞ ¼ aðxÞ where yox#Y ð7Þ
As we will see in Section 6, we always marginalize
a minimal variable out of a valuation. Therefore,
according to the semantic condition, a probability
valuation must be independent of D if it is to be
deleted. Table 8 in Section 7 shows how g = h#{T, O} is
obtained from h in Table 7.
Table 3
Computation of ab
{T, O, D, R, C} ab
t0 XO d0 XR XC 1.00
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR cp 0.90
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR cl 0.40
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR cp 0.10
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR cl 0.60
t3 0 d1 0 cp 0.80
t3 0 d1 0 cl 0.13
t3 0 d1 1 cp 0.10
t3 0 d1 1 cl 0.27
t3 1 d1 0 cp 0.10
t3 1 d1 0 cl 0.27
t3 1 d1 1 cl 0.33
t2 0 d0 XR cp 0.80
t2 0 d0 XR cl 0.13
t2 1 d0 XR cp 0.20
t2 1 d0 XR cl 0.53
t2 2 d0 XR cl 0.33
Table 4
Computation of s, d, and s/d
{T, O, D, R, C} s=(ab)c d= s#{T, O, D, R} s/d
t0 XO d0 XR cp 0.800 1.000 0.800
t0 XO d0 XR cl 0.200 0.200
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR cp 0.720 0.800 0.900
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR cl 0.080 0.100
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR cp 0.080 0.200 0.400
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR cl 0.120 0.600
t3 0 d1 0 cp 0.640 0.666 0.961
t3 0 d1 0 cl 0.026 0.039
t3 0 d1 1 cp 0.080 0.134 0.600
t3 0 d1 1 cl 0.054 0.400
t3 1 d1 0 cp 0.080 0.134 0.600
t3 1 d1 0 cl 0.054 0.400
t3 1 d1 1 cl 0.066 0.066 1.000
t2 0 d0 XR cp 0.640 0.666 0.961
t2 0 d0 XR cl 0.026 0.039
t2 1 d0 XR cp 0.160 0.266 0.600
t2 1 d0 XR cl 0.106 0.400
t2 2 d0 XR cl 0.066 0.066 1.000
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When a chance variable is to be reduced, margin-
alization corresponds to the summation of a valuation
over all the values of the chance variable. When the
valuation is a probability valuation, the summation is
simply the familiar marginalization operation in prob-
ability theory and the Dempster–Shafer theory of
belief functions [9]. When the valuation is a payoff
function, the summation represents a similar operation
called ‘‘averaging out’’ in solving a decision tree.
Mathematically, assume p is a payoff valuation of
X containing the chance variable R. The marginal of p
for Y=X {R}, denoted by p#Y, is a payoff valuation
for Y defined as follows:
p#Y ðyÞ ¼ RfpðxÞ j yox#Yg: ð8Þ
Assume a is a conditional probability function of H
given T and H contains a chance variable R. Let
X =H[T, K =H {R}, and Y=K[T. The marginal
of a for Y, denoted by a#Y, is a conditional belief
function of K given T defined as follows:
a#Y ðyÞ ¼ RfaðxÞ j y#K ¼ x#K ; y#Tox#Tg: ð9Þ
The column d in Table 4 shows the marginalization
of abc, which is a conditional probability valu-
ation of {O, R, C} given {T, D}, to {T, O, D, R}.
Table 6
The deletion of C and B (continued from Table 5)
{T, O, D, R, B, C} (s/d)r m WB u = m#{T, O, D, R}
t3 0 d1 1 b0 cl 0
t3 1 d1 0 b2 cp 36  4
t3 1 d1 0 b2 cl  40
t3 1 d1 0 b1 cp 12 28 b1 28
t3 1 d1 0 b1 cl 16
t3 1 d1 0 b0 cp 0 0
t3 1 d1 0 b0 cl 0
t3 1 d1 1 b2 cl  100  100
t3 1 d1 1 b1 cl 40 40 b1 40
t3 1 d1 1 b0 cl 0 0
t2 0 d0 XR b2 cp 57.66 53.76 b2 53.76
t2 0 d0 XR b2 cl  3.9
t2 0 d0 XR b1 cp 19.22 20.78
t2 0 d0 XR b1 cl 1.56
t2 0 d0 XR b0 cp 0 0
t2 0 d0 XR b0 cl 0
t2 1 d0 XR b2 cp 36  4
t2 1 d0 XR b2 cl  40
t2 1 d0 XR b1 cp 12 28 b1 28
t2 1 d0 XR b1 cl 16
t2 1 d0 XR b0 cp 0 0
t2 1 d0 XR b0 cl 0
t2 2 d0 XR b2 cl  100  100
t2 2 d0 XR b1 cl 40 40 b1 40
t2 2 d0 XR b0 cl 0 0
Table 7
The deletion of R
{T, O, D, R} h= d#{T, O, D} d/h u(d/h) w
t0 XO d0 XR 1.000 1.000 28.00 28.00
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR 0.800 1.000 44.00 44.00
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR 0.200 1.000 32.00 32.00
t3 0 d1 0 0.800 0.830 44.62 49.38
t3 0 d1 1 0.170 4.76
t3 1 d1 0 0.200 0.670 18.76 31.96
t3 1 d1 1 0.330 13.20
t2 0 d0 XR 0.666 1.000 53.76 53.76
t2 1 d0 XR 0.266 1.000 28.00 28.00
t2 2 d0 XR 0.066 1.000 40.00 40.00
Table 5
The deletion of C and B
{T, O, D, R, B, C} (s/d)r m WB u= m#{T, O, D, R}
t0 XO d0 XR b2 cp 48 28 b2 28
t0 XO d0 XR b2 cl  20
t0 XO d0 XR b1 cp 16 24
t0 XO d0 XR b1 cl 8
t0 XO d0 XR b0 cp 0 0
t0 XO d0 XR b0 cl 0
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR b2 cp 54 44 b2 44
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR b2 cl  10
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR b1 cp 18 22
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR b1 cl 4
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR b0 cp 0 0
{t1, t3} 0 d0 XR b0 cl 0
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR b2 cp 24  36
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR b2 cl  60
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR b1 cp 8 32 b1 32
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR b1 cl 24
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR b0 cp 0 0
{t1, t3} 1 d0 XR b0 cl 0
t3 0 d1 0 b2 cp 57.66 53.76 b2 53.76
t3 0 d1 0 b2 cl  3.9
t3 0 d1 0 b1 cp 19.22 20.78
t3 0 d1 0 b1 cl 1.56
t3 0 d1 0 b0 cp 0 0
t3 0 d1 0 b0 cl 0
t3 0 d1 1 b2 cp 36  4
t3 0 d1 1 b2 cl  40
t3 0 d1 1 b1 cp 12 28 b1 28
t3 0 d1 1 b1 cl 16
t3 0 d1 1 b0 cp 0 0
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4.3. Division
Operationally, division is opposite to combination.
Let a be a probability valuation for X and YoX. Then,
we define a/a#Y, called a divided by a#Y, to be a
probability valuation for X as follows:
ða=a#Y ÞðxÞ ¼ aðxÞ=a#Y ðyÞ: ð10Þ
Because a is positive for all focal elements, both a and
a#Y will be positive. Thus, the division in Eq. (10) is
always well defined. The last column in Table 4 shows
the division of (abc) by (abc)#{T, O, D, R}.
Note that divisions are critical to the recovery of
conditional probabilities when doing arc reversals in
an influence diagram. However, due to the fusion
algorithm [17], the division becomes less important in
a valuation network. As we will see shortly, if a
valuation network has only one payoff valuation as
assumed by influence diagrams, the division is no
longer necessary.
5. A fusion algorithm
According to Shenoy [17], solving a problem or
making an inference in a valuation-based system is
equivalent to marginalizing all variables out of the
joint valuation, which is the result of combining all
the valuations. For problems with a few variables, it is
feasible that we combine all the payoff and probability
valuations into one joint payoff valuation and then
marginalize it by eliminating the variables. However,
for a problem with a large number of variables, this
global computation approach is not feasible. As an
alternative, the fusion algorithm [17], based on the
idea of local computation, arranges the combination
and deletion process locally. A coarse valuation net-
work, the graphical representation of a decision
model, defines the computational architecture that
governs in what sequence valuations are combined
and variables are deleted. Specifically, Shenoy [17]
specifies that the operational sequence be in accord-
ance with the precedence constraints: It starts with a
minimal variable and then proceeds to the next
minimal variable until all the variables are deleted.
Each time when a variable is deleted, we combine all
the valuations that bear on the variable and then delete
the variable out the combined valuation. Shenoy [17]
calls each step of such local computation a fusion
operation. In the rest of this section, we define fusion
operations for coarse valuations.
Suppose a valuation network has n payoff valua-
tions p1, p2, . . ., pn and m probability valuations a1,
a2, . . ., am, where pi domain is Xi and aj domain is Yj
for i= 1, 2, . . ., n and j = 1, 2, . . ., m. The fusion
operation can be described under five different cases
depending on the type of the variable to be deleted.
5.1. Case 1
Suppose that D is a decision variable and DgYj for
j = 1, 2, . . ., m. Then, the set of valuations after
deleting D is:
ðfpi j DaXigÞ#XfDg
[ fpi j DgXig [ fa1; a2; . . . ; amg
where X =[{XijDaXi}. In words, after fusion, all the
payoff valuations that bear on D are combined and
marginalized such that D is eliminated. The other pay-
off valuations and all probability valuations remain
unchanged.
5.2. Case 2
Suppose R is a chance variable and RgXi for i = 1,
2, . . ., n. Then, the set of valuations after deleting R is:
ðfaj j RaYjgÞ#YfRg [ faj j RgYjg
[fp1; p2; . . . ; pmg
where Y=[{YjjRaYj}. In words, after fusion, those
probability valuations whose domain contains R are
combined and marginalized such that R is eliminated.
The other probability valuations and all the payoff
valuations remain unchanged.
5.3. Case 3
Suppose R is a chance variable and RaXi for i = 1,
2, . . ., n. Then, the set of valuations after deleting R is:
ðp  aÞ#X[YfRg [ faj j RgYjg
L. Liu, P.P. Shenoy / Decision Support Systems 37 (2004) 119–135128
where p ={piji = 1, 2, . . ., n}, a ={ajjRaYj}, X =[
{Xiji = 1, 2, . . ., n} and Y=[{YjjRaYj}. In words,
after fusion, all payoff valuations and those proba-
bility valuations that bear on R are combined and
marginalized such that R is eliminated. The other
probability valuations remain unchanged.
5.4. Case 4
Suppose R is a chance variable and only a part of the
payoff valuations bear on R. Then, the set of valuations
after deleting R is:
fa#XfRgg [ fpg [ fpi j RgXig [ faj j RgYjg
where a = {ajjRaYj}, p = [( {pijRaXi}) (a/
a#X {R})]#X[Y {R}, X =[{XijRaXi}, and Y=[{Yjj
RaYj}. In words, after fusion, the payoff and proba-
bility valuations that do not bear on R remain
unchanged. A new probability valuation a#X  {R}
and a new payoff valuation p are created.
Note that this is the only case divisions take
place. If a problem has only one payoff valuation,
then this case does not happen and divisions become
unnecessary.
5.5. Case 5
Suppose D is a decision variable and there exists j
such that DaYj. Then, the set of valuations after
deleting D is:
fpg [ fpi j DgXig [ faj j DgYjg
[fa#YjfDgj j DaYjg
where p=({pijDaXi})#X  {D}, X = [{XijDaXi}.
Note that, since the deletion is in accordance with
the precedence constraints, D is to be deleted when-
ever D is minimum. Therefore, D is minimum in Yj.
The semantic condition of the precedence constraints
dictates that aj is independent of D. Thus, aj
#Yj  {D} is
well defined by Eq. (7).
Note that Shenoy [17] avoids Case 5 by adding a
test in Case 4 to see whether a newly generated
probability valuation is vacuous. If it is, then the
fusion can be simplified as:
fpg [ fpi j RgXig [ faj j RgYjg
where p=[({pijRaXi})  ({ajjRaYj}]#X[Y  {R},
X =[{XijRaXi}, and Y=[{YjjRaYj}. This approach
does not always work as evidenced by h in Table 7.
Even though it works in some cases, we feel that it is
not efficient to add an extra test to Case 4.
6. The correctness of the fusion algorithm
This section intends to answer two technical ques-
tions regarding the fusion algorithm. First, will the
fusion algorithm produce a correct solution? Second,
because a precedence order is a partial order, there
may be multiple minimal variables at a certain step of
problem solving. The sequence for fusion operations
may be non-unique. Then, do different sequences give
the same solution?
Shenoy [17] positively answers these questions in
the context of conditional probabilities. His proof
relies on a few critical properties of the marginaliza-
tion operator on regular payoff and probability valu-
ations. To answer the questions in the context of
coarse valuations, we need to establish the equivalent
properties as follows:
Property 1. Suppose p is a coarse payoff valuation
for X and R1 and R2 are chance variables in X. Then
ðp#XfR1gÞ#XfR1; R2g ¼ ðp#XfR2gÞ#XfR1; R2g ð11Þ
Property 2. Suppose p is a coarse payoff valuation
for X, and D1 and D2 are decision variables in X.
Then
ðp#XfD1gÞ#XfD1; D2g ¼ ðp#XfD2gÞ#XfD1; D2g ð12Þ
Property 3. Suppose a is a coarse probability
valuation of H given T, and R1 and R2 are two
chance variables in H. Let X=H[T. Then
ða#XfR1gÞ#XfR1; R2g ¼ ða#XfR2gÞ#XfR1; R2g ð13Þ
Property 4. Suppose a is a coarse probability
valuation of H given T, and decision variables D1
and D2 belong to T and are minimal in X=H[T. Then
ða#XfD1gÞ#XfD1; D2g ¼ ða#XfD2gÞ#XfD1; D2g ð14Þ
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In words, these properties state that different orders
of eliminating multiple chance variables or multiple
decision variables do not affect the final result of the
marginalization. That is, we can delete two decision or
chance variables out of a coarse valuation in opposite
sequences but their end results are the same. The
verification of the above four properties is straightfor-
ward by using Eqs. (6)–(9). With these properties, we
can prove the following property:
Property 5. Deleting all the variables out of a coarse
valuation network in any sequence in accordance with
the precedence order produces a unique solution.
To prove this property, first we need to note that
the definitions of marginalization can be extended to
the case of eliminating multiple variables. For exam-
ple, suppose p is a payoff valuation for X and X1
and X2 are two variables in X. Then, p
#X {X1, X2} is
well defined with respect to the precedence order.
The reasoning is as follows. Because > is a partial
order, we have either X1>X2 or X2>X1 or X1fX2.
The marginal p#X {X1, X2} is well defined in the first
two cases because Xi is deleted after Xj whenever
Xi>Xj for i, j= 1, 2. In the case of X1fX2, X1 and
X2 are either both decision variables or both
chance variables according to the perfect recall
condition. Then, by Eqs. (11) and (12), the marginal
p#X {X1, X2} is the same no matter which order we
take to delete X1 and X2. Therefore, in all the cases,
p#X {X1, X2} is well defined. By induction, it is easy
to infer that the marginal p#X Y is well defined
with respect to a precedence order for every subset
YoX.
Second, suppose a valuation network has n payoff
valuations p1, p2, . . ., pn and m probability valuations
a1, a2, . . ., am, where pi bears on Xi and aj on Yj for
i = 1, 2, . . ., n and j= 1, 2, . . ., m. Let p ={piji= 1, 2,
. . ., n}, a={aiji= 1, 2, . . ., m}, X =[{Xiji = 1, 2, . . .,
n}, Y=[{Yjjj = 1, 2, . . ., m}, and Z =X[Y. Then,
according to Shenoy [17], solving a problem in a
coarse valuation-based system is a process of margin-
alizing pa to obtain (pa)#Z Z, i.e., (pa)#F. The
above analysis implies that the marginal (pa)#F is
unique with respect to a precedence order, even
though it may be obtained from a different sequence
of deleting the variables in Z.
Property 5 proves the uniqueness. Regarding the
correctness, by slightly modifying the proof to
Lemma 4 in Ref. [17], we can prove the following
property:
Property 6. Applying the fusion operations to all the
variables in a sequence in accordance with the
precedence order will produce the marginal (pa)#F.
According to Shenoy [17], problem solving in a
valuation-based systems is equivalent to computing
the marginal (pa)#F. Then according to Property
6, it is further equivalent to deleting all variables
from a coarse valuation network using the fusion
algorithm according to the precedence order. There-
fore, Property 6 implies the correctness of the fusion
algorithm.
Fig. 2. The valuation network after deleting C.
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7. An illustration
In this section, we demonstrate the fusion algo-
rithm to the used car buyer’s problem. First, as per the
precedence constraints (see Fig. 1), the deletion order
is CBRDOT.
7.1. Step 1
Since r bears on the chance variable C while p
and q do not, Case 4 of the fusion algorithm applies.
After the fusion, the new probability valuation is
d=(abc)#{T, O, D, R}, which is the conditional pro-
bability function of {O, R} given {T, D} (see Table 4).
The new payoff valuation is m=(r(s/d))#{T, O, D, B, R}
(see Tables 5 and 6). The other two payoff valuations p
and q are unchanged. The valuation network after
deleting C is shown in Fig. 2.
7.2. Step 2
Since B is a decision variable and no probability
valuations bear on B, Case 1 of the fusion algorithm
applies. After the fusion, the probability valuation d
and the payoff valuations p and q remain unchanged.
The payoff valuation m is marginalized such that B is
eliminated and a new payoff valuation u = m#{T, O, D, R}
is generated (see Tables 5 and 6). Fig. 3 shows the
valuation network after deleting B.
While marginalizing m using Eq. (6), we track the
solution to B with respect to m. For example,
WB({t0}XO {d0}XR)={b2}. It means that the
optimal decision is to buy the car without an anti-
lemon guarantee (B = b2) if no test is done (T= t0,
D = d0) and, of course, we are ignorant about the test
results (XO, XR).
7.3. Step 3
According to Fig. 3, the payoff valuation u bears
on the chance variable R while p and q do not, Case 4
of the fusion algorithm applies. After the fusion, the
new probability valuation is h = d#{T, O, D}. The new
payoff valuation is w=(u(d/h))#{T, O, D} (see Table
7). The other two payoff valuations p and q are
unchanged. The valuation network after deleting R
is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. The valuation network after deleting B.
Fig. 4. The valuation network after deleting R.
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7.4. Step 4
According to Fig. 4, the probability valuation h
bears on the decision variable D, Case 5 of the fusion
algorithm applies. After the fusion, h is reduced into
g = h#{T, O}. The payoff valuations w and q are
combined and then marginalized into j such that D
is eliminated. The payoff valuation p remains
unchanged. The numerical result is shown in Table
8. After the deletion of D, the valuation network is
shown in Fig. 5.
7.5. Step 5
According to Fig. 5, the payoff valuation j bears
on the chance variable O while p does not. Therefore,
Case 4 of the fusion algorithm applies. After the
fusion, the new probability valuation is g#T. The
new payoff valuation is k=[j(g/g#T)]#T (see Table
9). The payoff valuation p remains unchanged. The
valuation network after deleting O is shown in Fig. 6.
7.6. Step 6
According to Fig. 6, the probability valuation g#T
bears on the decision variable T, Case 5 of the fusion
algorithm applies. After the fusion, g#T is reduced into
g#/ by using Eq. (7). The payoff valuations k and p are
combined and then marginalized into (kp)#/ such
that T is eliminated. The numerical result is shown in
Table 10. After the deletion of T, no more variables are
left and the entire valuation network is solved.
The optimal strategy for the used car buyer’s
problem has been registered by the three solutions
WT, WD, and WB. According to WT in Table 10, t2 (the
fuel and electric test) should be chosen as an initial
test. According to WD in Table 8, given T= t2, the
optimal choice for D is d0 (no differential test)
Table 8
The deletion of D
{T, O, D} g wq WD j
t0 XO d0 1.000 28.00 d0 28.00
t1 0 d0 0.800 44.00 d0 44.00
t1 1 d0 0.200 32.00 d0 32.00
t2 0 d0 0.666 53.76 d0 53.76
t2 1 d0 0.266 28.00 d0 28.00
t2 2 d0 0.066 40.00 d0 40.00
t3 0 d0 0.800 44.00
t3 0 d1 45.38 d1 45.38
t3 1 d0 0.200 32.00 d0 32.00
t3 1 d1 27.96
Table 9
The deletion of O
{T, O} g#T g/g#T j(g/g#T) k
t0 XO 1.0 1.000 28.00 28.00
t1 0 1.0 0.800 35.20 41.60
t1 1 0.200 6.40
t2 0 1.0 0.666 35.80 45.89
t2 1 0.266 7.45
t2 2 0.066 2.64
t3 0 1.0 0.800 36.30 42.70
t3 1 0.200 6.40
Fig. 5. The valuation network after deleting D. Fig. 6. The valuation network after deleting O.
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regardless the initial test result. Finally, according to
WB in Tables 5 and 6, given T= t2, the optimal strategy
is to buy the car without an anti-lemon guarantee (b2)
if the initial test t2 does not find any errors and buy the
car with an anti-lemon guarantee (b1) if the initial test
does find one or two defective systems. The optimal
value for the problem is 32.89.
8. Conclusion and discussion
By applying the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief
functions, this paper proposed a notion of coarse
valuations for representing domain knowledge in the
context of decision-making under uncertainty. By
using examples, it demonstrated how we could com-
pactly and efficiently represent payoff and probability
functions. It established the conditions that coarse
valuations must follow in order to permit inference
reasoning in a coarse valuation-based system. It
defined combination and marginalization operations
that stipulate how to manipulate coarse valuations in
a system. It proposed a fusion algorithm and a compu-
tational architecture for problem solving in a coarse
valuation-based system. Finally, it showed the correct-
ness of the fusion algorithm and illustrated the algo-
rithm using a comprehensive example.
This research has made a contribution to the con-
ceptual foundation of decision support system. The
notion of coarse valuations bridges the gap between
the Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions and
Bayesian theory of probability functions. Like belief
functions, the coarse valuations follow the semantics
of evidential support. They avoid artificial priors in
the Bayesian theory by representing partial indecisive-
ness using focal elements and complete ignorance
using vacuous valuations. In the meantime, they allow
a compact model for probabilistic IF–THEN asser-
tions. In addition, the rule of combining coarse
valuations includes as special cases both Dempster’s
rule of combination and the Bayesian rule of con-
ditioning. Furthermore, the conditions that coarse
valuations must follow, as a matter of fact, specify
the conditions that enable belief functions to be useful
not only for uncertainty reasoning in artificial intelli-
gence but also useful for developing decision support
systems.
This research has also made two contributions to the
implementation of decision support systems in general
and valuation-based systems in particular. First, it
extends the framework of valuation-based systems to
allow more flexible judgments of probabilities and
payoffs in knowledge representation. An influence
diagram allows only conditional probabilities; a tradi-
tional valuation-based system allows conditional as
well as joint probabilities. In contrast, a coarse valu-
ation-based system allows not only conditional and
joint probabilities but also belief functions and other
belief function-like calculus. Second, and most impor-
tantly, this paper made a contribution to the represen-
tation of asymmetric decision problems. Asymmetry is
prevalent while symmetry is rare. To represent an
asymmetric decision problem in a decision support
system, both influence diagrams and valuation net-
works have to introduce dummy events and acts, and
degenerate probabilities and utilities to make it sym-
metric. The symmetrization can explode the problem
space by up to 90%, as illustrated by the used car
buyer’s problem. This is why influence diagrams still
cannot replace decision trees to be implemented in
decision support systems. This paper showed that
coarse valuations are the most compact and natural
representation of payoffs and uncertainties. They are
even more expressive than a decision tree. As we have
shown, a coarse valuation network can take full advant-
age of both conditional independence and numerical
coalescence. On the other hand, because it lacks a
mechanism to represent conditional independence, a
Table 10
The deletion of T
T kp WT (kp)#/
t0 28.00
t1 32.60
t2 32.89 t2 32.89
t3 32.70
Table 11
A comparison of different representations of the used car buyer’s
problem
Method # Probabilities # Utilities
Coalesced decision trees 35 35
Symmetric influence diagrams 226 12
Coarse valuations 20 11
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decision tree can exploit conditional independence
only if a causal relation coincides with the chronolog-
ical order. Meanwhile, a decision tree can exploit
numerical coalescence only when one branch of the
tree is identical to another.
Table 11 compares the representations of the used
car buyer’s problem using three different methods. It
shows that a coalesced decision tree (Fig. 5 on p. 702 in
Ref. [7]) needs 35 probabilities and 35 utilities to
represent the problem. Of course, the probabilities in
the decision tree representation are obtained after pre-
processing from 14 probabilities. A symmetric influ-
ence diagram representation (or a symmetric valuation
network representation) requires specifying 226 prob-
abilities and 12 utilities. On the other hand, a coarse
valuation network needs only 20 probabilities and 11
utilities, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.
The larger the problem space, the more calculation it
requires. A comparison of computational efficiencies is
important. However, because the three methods use
different algorithms to solve problems, any comparison
is naturally tied to their implementations. Here, we only
give an approximate magnitude to show the differ-
ences. For example, to delete the variable C in the used
car buyer’s problem, no matter which method we
employ, we have to multiply the probability valuations
a, b, and c. To do so, the decision tree method requires
64 multiplications. A symmetric influence diagram
requires 12,288 multiplications. The coarse valuation
method requires 160 multiplications. Of course, both
the decision tree method and the influence diagram
method require additional divisions andmultiplications
to make Bayesian revisions complete. Also, if no
special data structures are designed to avoid them, the
coarse valuation method requires additional 160 set
intersections.
This paper has dealt with theoretical issues in-
volved in the implementation of a decision support
system for decision-making under uncertainty. How-
ever, it does not describe any complete implementa-
tion. Future research and development along this line
of inquiries is definitely needed in order to practically
validate the efficiency of our proposed knowledge
representation technique and the fusion algorithm.
Theoretically, this paper applied coarse valuations to
valuation-based systems. We expect that they are also
applicable to influence diagrams. However, this has
not been done to date.
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